The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Hungary

1. Establishment of the Constitutional Court (Alkotmánybíróság; abbreviated as AB)

It was in January 1989 that the Hungarian Parliament passed a resolution on the establishment of the Constitutional Court; its organisation and authority, however, had been determined earlier in the framework of the trilateral political roundtable negotiations preparing the democratic transformation of the political system. The basic provisions on the Constitutional Court were laid down in October 1989 by Parliament by way of amending the Constitution (Article 32/A), according to the agreement reached at the above negotiations.
These new provisions of the Constitution already reflected the needs of political transformation: the new institution was set up in order to promote the establishment of a state governed by the rule of law as well as the protection of constitutional order and fundamental rights. Act XXXII of 1989 on the Constitutional Court was passed by Parliament on 19 October 1989, and the Constitutional Court started its work on 1 January 1990.

2. Organisation and Procedure of the Constitutional Court

The Constitutional Court serves as the main body for the protection of the Constitution, its tasks being the review of the constitutionality of statutes, and the protection of constitutional order and fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
In the Constitution only certain basic rules concerning the Constitutional Court are laid down, while its organisation was left to be provided for by a separate Act of Parliament. According to the Constitution, in order to pass the Act on the organisation and procedure of the Constitutional Court, the votes of two-thirds of the Members of Parliament present are required.
The Constitutional Court performs its tasks independently. Having its own budget and its judges being elected by Parliament it does not constitute a part of the ordinary judicial system. The Constitutional Court draws up its own draft budget and then, as part of the state budget, sends it to Parliament for approval.
The Constitutional Court has eleven members. From among their number and for a term of three years they elect a President and a Vice-president, who perform activities of co-ordination and representation without affecting thereby the independence of the judges.
Although the Constitution determined Esztergom as the seat of the Constitutional Court, the conditions for operation there being absent from the very beginning, the Constitutional Court has been operating in Budapest ever since its establishment.
The decisions of the Constitutional Court are binding for all and no appeal may be lodged against them. Issues concerning the constitutionality of Acts of Parliament are decided by plenary sessions comprising all judges, while the constitutionality of government decrees or statutes of a lower level are decided, as a general rule, by chambers consisting of three judges. Decisions are made by a majority of votes.
Decisions of the Constitutional Court annulling statutes or interpreting certain provisions of the Constitution are published in the Hungarian Official Gazette. All decisions and orders closing a case are published in the official gazette "Decisions of the Constitutional Court". Apart from the text of the decision adopted by a majority of votes, the minority positions are also published (dissenting opinion or concurring opinion).
According to the Act, the detailed rules on the organisation and procedure of the Constitutional Court are established by the Rules of Procedure, laid down by an Act of Parliament on the proposal of the Constitutional Court.

3. Members of the Constitutional Court

The Constitution declares that members of the Constitutional Court shall be elected by Parliament. It also determines the rules of such elections. Impartiality is guaranteed by the rule according to which candidacy for justice to the Constitutional Court is put forward by a nominating committee consisting of one member each from the factions of parties represented in Parliament and shall be elected by a two-thirds majority of all Members of Parliament.
As regards the professional requirements to be met by judges of the Constitutional Court, the relevant rule provides that only jurists of outstanding theoretical knowledge or having at least twenty years of legal practice may be elected members of the Constitutional Court. Membership is for a term of nine years and members may be re-elected once. The office of judges of the Constitutional Court comes to an end when they reach the age of 70 years.
In order to guarantee the full independence of the Constitutional Court, the Act determines certain grounds for incompatibility. Members of the Constitutional Court may not be Members of Parliament, members of a local government body of representatives, heads of interest groups or members of a political party, and they may not pursue any other gainful occupation except for scientific, teaching, literary or artistic activities. Another means of guaranteeing the above independence is the right of immunity granted to judges of the Constitutional Court, equivalent to that of Members of Parliament. Only the Constitutional Court, when sitting in plenary session, has the power to waive such immunity. Judges of the Constitutional Court may not be recalled by Parliament, they may only be removed from office by the above plenary session and in cases defined by the relevant Act of Parliament.
The original idea was to elect, at three successive points of time, five judges each (i.e. fifteen judges) to the Constitutional Court. However, the Constitution was amended in 1994, whereby the number of judges of the Constitutional Court was reduced to eleven. The first five judges of the Constitutional Court were elected at the end of 1989, the second five following the parliamentary elections of May 1990. Since 1990 Parliament has elected new judges to the Constitutional Court several times to replace those whose office terminated, without renewing anyone in their office.

4. Competence and Jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court

On the basis of the Constitution and a separate Act of Parliament passed simultaneously therewith, a Constitutional Court was established which has, in comparison with corresponding institutions all over the world, a wide competence and to which over 1000 motions have been submitted each year ever since.

A/ Posterior review of the constitutionality of statutes

The activities of the Constitutional Court are focussed on the review of the constitutionality of statutes and the annulment thereof if they are found unconstitutional. It is the above posterior review of legal norms that the majority of motions are aimed at.
The vast majority of motions have been submitted by private persons. According to the relevant rule, anyone may contest any statute of the Hungarian legal system (except the Constitution) or any other legal instrument of public administration (e.g. a ministerial instruction), irrespective of the fact whether it affects or violates any fundamental right of the given person. Such "actio popularis" led, for example, to the annulment by the Constitutional Court of the death penalty in 1990 [Decision No. 23/1990. (X. 31.) AB].
Its power of posterior review of legal norms has been interpreted by the Constitutional Court on several occasions and from several points of view. In one of its decisions in 1993, the Constitutional Court held that as a result of the review of constitutionality of a statute the Constitutional Court may determine in its decision the constitutional requirements to be met in interpreting the legal norm [Decision No. 38/1993. (VI. 11.) AB]. The prevailing practice is that the Constitutional Court resorts to this method when annulment would not directly remedy the grievance in question (as annulment would result in a gap in the law, for instance), and the given unconstitutionality might be eliminated by defining the constitutional content of the legal norm.
Constitutional requirements are established either for the lawmakers or for those applying legal norms. When the Constitutional Court formulates such requirements for lawmakers, it actually determines the essence of the obligation to regulate and the constitutional framework thereof [e.g. Decision No. 1/1995. (III. 13.) AB]. More frequent, however, are cases where constitutional requirements are determined for those applying legal norms and pertain to the application thereof.
There have also been cases where the Constitutional Court extended its activities to the monitoring of constitutionality of the application of legal norms in practice. In a case involving the right of children to reveal their ancestry, it has held that it is not the text of the legal norm itself but the prevailing legal norm as it is given effect, enforced and realised, i.e. "living law", that is to be compared with the content of the provisions of the Constitution and with constitutional principles [Decision No. 57/1991. (XI. 8.) AB].
As for the content of the constitutional requirement, it can be either positive or negative. In the former case the Constitutional Court determines either a range within which interpretation of the legal norm remains within the framework of the Constitution [e.g. Decision No. 36/1994. (VI. 24.) AB], or the one possible interpretation that is constitutional [e.g. Decision No. 57/1995. (IX. 15.) AB]. By way of a negative definition the Constitutional Court determines which interpretation of the legal norm is unconstitutional. In the latter case the legal norm may not be applied in the context defined by the Constitutional Court [e.g. Decision No. 46/1997. (IX. 30.) AB].
In connection with its power of posterior review of legal norms the Constitutional Court has set forth that in the course of its proceedings domestic law, international treaties and the Constitution shall be examined in parallel and in correlation with each other, and therefore in certain cases the question whether an obligation assumed under international law is in accordance with the Constitution or not is to be answered as well. On the basis of a motion aimed at such examination, the Constitutional Court has laid down that a statute promulgating an international treaty may also be subjected to an examination of constitutionality, and consequently the review might be extended even to the examination of the unconstitutionality of the international treaty, now constituting a part of the statute promulgating it [Decision No. 4/1997. (I. 22.) AB].
The competence of the Constitutional Court does not include any review of the Constitution itself. Therefore the Constitutional Court establishes its lack of competence in cases where the motion for posterior review of legal norms is aimed either at the alteration of the provisions of the Constitution or at the resolving of a real or alleged contradiction therein (i.e. Order No. 1125/I/1990. AB). The Constitutional Court has also interpreted its competence of posterior review of legal norms to determine whether it includes the examination of Acts of Parliament amending the Constitution. On the basis of its being bound to the Constitution, the Constitutional Court has held that it has no competence for the posterior review of any amended text now forming an integral part of the Constitution, namely Acts of Parliament amending the Constitution (Decision No. 1260/B/1997. AB).
Judges, while staying the proceedings of a case pending before them, may also initiate a posterior review of legal norms if they would have to apply a statute they deem unconstitutional. In cases initiated by judges the Constitutional Court, according to a decision made within its competence, passes specially prompt judgement. At the moment such motions account for less than 2 per cent of all motions.

B/ Prior, or Preventive Review of Unconstitutionality of Statutes

A more limited and less frequently applied form of control of the constitutionality of statutes is the so called prior, or preventive review of legal norms.
The form of preventive review of legal norms, to be exercised by the President of the Republic, has been laid down in the Constitution. This right of the President of the Republic may be considered a "constitutional veto" and it applies to the review of constitutionality of Acts passed by Parliament but not yet promulgated. This "veto" prevents the given Act of Parliament from entering into force before a review of its constitutionality. If unconstitutionality is established, the Act is returned to Parliament, which then has the obligation to eliminate such unconstitutionality.
Although there have been only a few cases where a preventive review of legal norms has been initiated by the President of the Republic, these were of great significance, such as the review of unconstitutionality of the Act on the prosecutability of crimes not prosecuted for political reasons [e.g. Decision No. 11/1992. (III. 5.) AB] or of that on the partial compensation for damage caused unjustly to the property of citizens during the past political regime [Decision No. 28/1991. (VI. 3.) AB]. The above decisions have been of fundamental importance in the process of a peaceful transition to the rule of law.
The review of constitutionality of the Act restricting the acquisition of property rights for agricultural land [Decision No. 35/1994. (VI. 24.) AB] as well as the review of the Act on the rules of actions to be taken against organised crime [Decision No. 1/1999. (II. 24.) AB] were also initiated by the President of the Republic. The latter initiative was not directed at a content-related but at a form-related examination, with the aim of clarifying whether the Constitution requires simple or qualified majority. In its decision the Constitutional Court held that the requirement of a qualified majority in order to pass certain Acts of Parliament determined by the Constitution is not merely a prescription pertaining to the form of legislative procedure, but it represents a constitutional guarantee, an essential component of which being the wide consent among Members of Parliament.
There used to be another form of preventive review of legal norms, ensuring the right of (at least) fifty Members of Parliament to ask for the preventive review of unconstitutionality of bills having just reached the stage of final decision. Several decisions of significance were made by the Constitutional Court acting in the above competence. This form of initiating preventive review of legal norms, not laid down not in the Constitution itself but in an Act of Parliament, was abolished by Parliament in 1998 in an amendment to the Act on the Constitutional Court.
The Act on the Constitutional Court also allows the preventive review of constitutionality of provisions of international treaties before ratification. Such preventive review may be initiated by Parliament, the President of the Republic or the Government. So far none of those entitled have submitted any such motions.

C/ Review of Statutes for Conformity with International Treaties

The Act on the Constitutional Court also allows proceedings in cases where the contested statute violates an international treaty. This can be traced back to a provision of the Constitution, according to which Hungary accepts the generally recognised rules of international law and ensures that domestic law be in conformity with its obligations assumed under international law. Such proceedings may be initiated by the organs or persons designated by law (e.g. by Parliament, its Standing Committees, MPs, by the President of the Republic, by the Council of Ministers), as well as proprio motu by the Constitutional Court. So far only a small number of motions have been lodged with the Court on such grounds.
Regarding its application in practice, violation of international treaties by statutes, as a separate competence, is of a supplementary nature, and apart from an examination whether statutes are in conformity with the Constitution, it also renders possible their examination whether they are in breach of international treaties. Since proceedings in the above competence may also be initiated proprio motu - ex officio -, the Constitutional Court has taken the opportunity to compare domestic law with international documents on human rights and the practice of application thereof. Since the promulgation in 1993 of the European Convention of Human Rights, the Constitutional Court has been continuously monitoring the practice of organs operating in Strasbourg and occasionally refers, in the course of passing judgements in cases, to the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights [e.g. Decision No. 5/1999. (III. 31.) AB].

D/ Determining Unconstitutional Omission to Legislate

The Constitutional Court may also establish that a legislative organ has created an unconstitutional situation by failing to perform its task to legislate. Proceedings may be initiated by anyone, or the Constitutional Court may proceed ex officio. In cases where such omission is established, the legislative organ in question has the obligation to comply with its task to legislate as indicated by the Constitutional Court in its appeal.
The Constitutional Court has interpreted its competence of establishing unconstitutional omission to legislate in several of its decisions. According to these, unconstitutional omission to legislate may be established by the Constitutional Court not only in cases where the given Act of Parliament has not been passed notwithstanding an explicit authorisation for that conferred by the Constitution but also in the absence of such authorisation, provided that the guarantees necessary for the assertion of fundamental rights are missing or where incomplete regulation jeopardises the constitutional assertion of rights [Decision No. 37/1992. (VI. 10.) AB; Decision No. 22/1995. (III. 31.) AB]. In another of its decisions the Constitutional Court has pointed out that unconstitutional omission to legislate may be established not only in lack of any regulations pertaining to the given subject matter but also where there is no statutory provision within the given regulatory concept that can be derived from the Constitution [e.g. Decision No. 27/1997. (IV. 29.) AB]. In interpreting this competence, in one of its later decisions the Constitutional Court drew the conclusion that the establishment of unconstitutional omission to legislate may also be justified by incomplete regulation violating legal certainty [e.g. Decision No. 4/1999. (III. 31.) AB].
In this competence the Constitutional Court has made several decisions of significance, for instance when it established unconstitutionality on the ground of a lack of rules of guarantee in the Act on national referenda [Decision No. 2/1993. (I. 22.) AB], or when it established omission on several occasions in connection with the Standing Orders of Parliament, on the grounds of its lacking the guarantees of legislative procedures in accordance with the Constitution [e.g. Decision No. 29/1997. (IV. 29.) AB].
Whenever the Constitutional Court establishes unconstitutional omission to legislate, it calls upon the lawmaker to perform its obligation to regulate and fixes a time limit therefor.

E/ Passing Judgement on Constitutional Complaints

Those aggrieved in their rights guaranteed by the Constitution may lodge a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court if their grievance has been due to the application of a statute contrary to the Constitution and provided that they have already exhausted all other means of legal remedy. Complaints may be lodged within sixty days of delivery of a final judicial or administrative decision. Indeed, the procedure in connection with constitutional complaints might also be conceived as posterior review of legal norms only in individual cases; i.e. it is the constitutionality of the statute applied in the given case that the Constitutional Court reviews and not whether the given decision made by judges or state authorities violates any of the petitioner's constitutional rights. The Hungarian Constitutional Court can remedy the petitioner's grievance only inasmuch as it prohibits the application in the given case of the statute found unconstitutional.
The establishment of unconstitutionality of the reviewed statute does not, however, automatically entail prohibition of the application thereof [see e.g. Decision No. 59/1993. (XI. 29.) AB]. The Constitutional Court gives due consideration to all the circumstances of the case, including whether it is in the petitioner's "utmost interest" that the legal norm not be applied in the given case.
The amendment in 1999 of Act III of 1952 on Civil Procedure made it possible for petitioners to move for a new trial of their case by ordinary courts provided that, on the basis of the complaint, the Constitutional Court establishes with retroactive effect the unconstitutionality of application in the given case of the contested statute. Thus constitutional complaints have become a real means of legal remedy, although motions lodged within this competence are still quite few.
Under constitutional complaints the Constitutional Court may review the constitutionality of already repealed statutes as well [Decision No. 51/1998.. (XI. 27.) AB].
The strict conditions laid down for lodging such complains might account for the fact that constitutional complaints represent only about 1 per cent of all motions.

F/ Resolution of Certain Conflicts of Competence

The Constitutional Court may pass judgement in questions related to conflicts of competence among different state organs or local government authorities, as well as in those between a local authority and a state organ. Such motions are lodged in negligible numbers.
The competence of the Constitutional Court to resolve conflicts of competence does not extend to the resolution of constitutional conflicts between branches of government, and therefore such cases (e.g. constitutional disputes between the government and the President of the Republic) have been decided within some other competence of the Constitutional Court (posterior review of legal norms, abstract interpretation of the Constitution) [Decision No. 36/1992. (VI. 10.) AB].
Due to the nature of this competence of the Constitutional Court, only issues of lesser significance belong to the category of resolution of conflicts of competence, such as the Constitutional Court's designating the organ to act in conflicts of competence between a settlement's notary and medical officer's service (Decision No. 911/F/1998. AB) or between the notary and the environment protection inspectorate (Decision No. 503/F/1997. AB).

G/ Interpretation of Provisions of the Constitution

With each of its decisions the Constitutional Court necessarily interprets certain provisions of the Constitution as well. The Constitutional Court, however, has also been given by an Act of Parliament the competence to interpret, upon the motion of organs laid down therein, certain constitutional rules in the abstract and regardless of particular cases. There are not many Constitutional Courts that have been endowed with such powers. Scarce in number (under one per cent of all motions), these motions are nonetheless of great importance in terms of constitutional law. In 1991 and 1992, for instance, in two of its decisions the Constitutional Court dealt with the interpretation of the constitutional competence of the President of the Republic [Decisions No. 48/1991. (IX. 26.) and No. 36/1992. (VI. 10.) AB]. The constitutional framework for legislation on compensation was also determined by an abstract interpretation of property rights and the prohibition of discrimination [Decision No. 21/1990. ( X. 4.) AB]. In interpreting the Constitution the Constitutional Court has made the restriction that motions are to be aimed at a particular constitutional problem, fending off thereby the danger of assuming a responsibility otherwise to be borne by the legislator or the government.
One of the decisions made in recent years within the competence of interpreting the Constitution was initiated by the President of the Supreme Court, seeking an answer, in connection with a particular case, to the question whether children may be members of associations for the legal protection of homosexuals. In its decision the Constitutional Court interpreted the provisions of the Constitution pertaining to child protection as well as to the right of association [Decision No. 21/1997. (V . 17.) AB]. Another significant decision was the one made upon a motion lodged by parliamentary commissioners and interpreting the provision of the Constitution declaring the right to social security from the point of view of the right to housing. The Constitutional Court pointed out that the right to social security laid down in the Constitution contains state guarantees for the minimum of subsistence to be ensured by the entirety of social provisions. From the guarantee of the minimum of subsistence no specific rights (such as "the right to housing") may be derived as fundamental constitutional rights. The Constitutional Court determined, however, that in framing the system of social provisions the protection of human life and dignity is a basic constitutional requirement. Therefore, the state has the obligation to provide the basic conditions of human existence, including shelter for the homeless in order to ward off the dangers directly threatening human life [Decision No. 42/2000. (XI. 8.) AB].
Within its competence to abstractly interpret the Constitution the Constitutional Court has made twenty-one decisions in the past ten years.

H/ Miscellaneous Proceedings

According to the Constitution, it falls within the competence of the Constitutional Court to conduct criminal proceedings against the President of the Republic and to pass judgement on his or her actions, as well as to give an opinion on the proposals of the Government made for Parliament and related to the dissolution of local government bodies of representatives on grounds of unconstitutional operation. The Act on the Constitutional Court makes it possible for other Acts of Parliament to refer certain other procedures to the competence of the Constitutional Court. Thereupon Act C of 1997 on the election procedure specified and at the same time expanded the competence of the Constitutional Court related to national referenda, making the Constitutional Court in such matters an instance for legal redress and ordaining specially prompt proceedings. Within the above competence the Constitutional Court may pass a final decision whether or not a referendum may be held on the given issue (the Constitution defining the scope of subject matters on which no referenda may be held), and it is to be decided by the Constitutional Court as well whether decisions made by Parliament on holding or refusing to hold a referendum are in accordance with the Constitution. It was within the above competence that the Constitutional Court found unconstitutional the motions for a referendum on whether capital punishment should be restored [Decision No. 11/1999. (V. 7.) AB] or on changing of the form of government [Decision No. 28/1999. (X. 6.) AB]. These decisions are in conformity with the Constitutional Court's standpoint set forth in connection with a case related to another competence of the Constitutional Court and stating that no referendum may aim at initiating an amendment of the Constitution [Decision No. 2/1993. ( I. 22.) AB].




В 1989 году Парламент Венгрии принял решение о создании Конституционного Суда, но основные положения о Конституционном Суде Парламент, дополнив Конституцию (статья 32/А), принял в октябре 1989 года. Конституционный Суд начал свою работу 1 января 1990 года.

Конституционный Суд является основным органом по защите Конституции, его задачей является осуществление контроля за конституционностью законов и защита конституционных норм и фундаментальных прав, гарантируемые Конституцией.

Конституция содержит только основные нормы о Конституционном Суде, а вопросы ее организации регулируются отдельным законом, который, согласно Конституции, должен быть принят 2/3-ими голосов членов Парламента.

В исполнении своих обязанностей Конституционный Суд независим. Конституционный Суд не является частью общей судебной системы. Конституционный Суд сам составляет свой бюджет и, как часть государственного бюджета, предъявляет его на утверждение Парламента.

Конституционный Суд состоит из 11 членов. Из их числа на 3 года избираются Президент и Вице-президент, которые исполняют координирующие и представительные функции без воздействия на независимость членов Конституционного Суда.

Решения Конституционного Суда обязательны для всех и обжалованию не подлежат. Решения о конституционности актов Парламента выносятся на пленарное заседание в составе всех судей, а решения о конституционности решений правительства и актов низшего уровня, как правило, расматриваются палатами в составе трех судей. Решения принимаются большинством голосов.

Решения Конституционного Суда о прекращении действии актов или о толковании норм Коституции публикуются в официальной газете Венгрии. Все решения Конституционного Суда и решения о прекращении дела публикуются в официальной газете ”Решения Конституционного Суда”. Кроме решений публикуются также особые мнения судей.

Члены Конституционного Суда избираются 2/3-ими голосов членов Парламента. Кандидаты представляются комиссией, в состав которой входят по одному из членов партий, представленных в Парламенте.

Членами Конституционного Суда могут быть только юристы-теоретики или в последние 12 лет - практикующиеся юристы. Члены Конституционного Суда избираются на 9 лет и могут быть вторично переизбраны. Полмомочия членов Конституционного Суда прекращаются по достижении ими 70 - летнего возраста.

Члены Конституционного Суда не могут выполнять иную работу, кроме научной, педагогической и творческой. Они пользуются таким же иммунитетом, каким пользуются члены Парламента. Член Конституционного Суда не может быть отозван Парламентом. Иммунитета может лишить только Конституционный Суд в пленарном заседании. Член Конституционного Суда может быть освобожден от должности только в предусмотренных законом случаях.

В Конституционный Суд поступает более 1000 заявлений в год.

Конституционный Суд осуществляет последующий контроль, и большинство заявлений принимаются от частных лиц. Согласно закону, каждый имеет право обжаловать любой акт венгерской правовой системы (кроме Конституции) или акт публичной администрации, если он нарушает или затрагивает любое право человека.

Судьи по делам, находящимся на их рассмотрении, также могут возбудить дело в Конституционном Суде, если применяемый акт, по их мнению, противоречит Конституции. В таких случаях Конституционный Суд принимает срочные решения.

Превентивный контроль за конституционностью правовых норм осуществляется по заявлению Президента Республики. Это право Президента касается “конституционного вето” и актов Парламента, которые еще не вступили в силу. Это вето не позволяет вступить в силу акт Парламента, пока не решится вопрос его конституционности. Если он признается неконституционным, он возвращается в Парламент, который обязан устранить неконституционность.

Существует также и другая форма превентивного контроля, которая позволяет как минимум 15 членам Парламента оспорить конституционность закона, который находится в последней стадии принятия.

Закон “О Конституционном Суде” предусматривает возможность превентивного контроля за конституционностью международных договоров, которые еще не ратифицированы. Такой контроль может осуществляться по заявлению Парламента, Президента или Правительства.До сих пор такой контроль не осуществлялся.

В Конституционном Суде можно возбудить дело в случаях, когда законодатель создает неконституционную ситуацию, не исполнив свои обязанности. Такое дело может возбудить каждый или сам Конституционный Суд. Когда Конституционный Суд устанавливает неконституционность бездействия законодателя, он своим решением в назначенные сроки обязывает его исполнить свой долг.

Индивидуальные конституционные жалобы могут быть представлены в Конституционный Суд, только когда исчерпаны все внутригосударственные средства защиты. Жалобы могут быть предъявлены в течение 60 дней со дня вынесения окончательного судебного или административного решения.

На основе конституционной жалобы Конституционный Суд может также проверить конституционность уже не существующих актов. Из-за очень строгих условий, предусмотренных для подачи таких жалоб, их число составляет 1% от всех заявлений.

Конституционный Суд может принять решения по вопросам споров о компетенции между разными государственными и местными органами управления, а также споров между государственными и местными органами управления. Полномочия Конституционного Суда разрешать такие споры не распространяются на конфликты между ветвями власти.

Кроме того, что в своих решениях Конституционный Суд дает толкование некоторых норм Конституции, он также уполномочен давать толкование норм Конституции по прошению уполномоченных органов. За последние 12 лет своего существования Конституционный Суд по делам о толковании Конституции принял 21 решение.

Согласно Конституции, Конституционный Суд уполномочен возбуждать уголовный процес против Президента Республики и принимать решение о его действиях, а также по представлению правительства выражать мнение для Парламента, связанное с роспуском местного представительного органа на основании неконституционных действий.

Актом “С “ 1997года ”О Выборах” Конституционный Суд наделен полномочиями, связанными с национальным референдумом. В рамках этих полномочий Конституционный Суд может принять решение о проведении референдума по тому или иному вопросу, а также решить вопрос о конституционности решения Парламента о проведении или отказа в проведении референдума.